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Abstract— Data for controlling a vehicle is exchanged among
Electronic Control Units (ECUs) via in-vehicle network protocols
such as the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol. Since these
protocols are designed for an isolated network, the protocols do
not encrypt data nor authenticate messages. Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs) are developed to secure the CAN protocol by de-
tecting abnormal deviations in physical properties. For instance,
a voltage-based IDS (VIDS) exploits voltage characteristics of
each ECU to detect an intrusion. An ECU with VIDS must be
connected to the CAN bus using extra wires to measure voltages
of the CAN bus lines. These extra wires, however, may introduce
new attack surfaces to the CAN bus if the ECU with VIDS is
compromised. We investigate new vulnerabilities of VIDS and
demonstrate that an adversary may damage an ECU with VIDS,
block message transmission, and force an ECU to retransmit
messages. In order to defend the CAN bus against these attacks,
we propose two hardware-based Intrusion Response Systems
(IRSs) that disconnect the compromised ECU from the CAN
bus once these attacks are detected. We develop four voltage-
based attacks by exploiting vulnerabilities of VIDS and evaluate
the effectiveness of the proposed IRSs using a CAN bus testbed.
Index Terms—Controller Area Network, Voltage-based Attack,
Intrusion Response System, Mitigation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in a vehicle exchange data
via in-vehicle network protocols such as Controller Area Net-
work (CAN) [2], Local Interconnect Network (LIN) [3], and
FlexRay [4]. These in-vehicle network protocols do not have
cryptographic primitives such as data encryption or message
authentication because in-vehicle networks were designed to
be isolated from external networks [2]–[4]. Modern vehicles,
however, are equipped with many ECUs that have outward-
facing interfaces such as auxiliary port (AUX), Wi-Fi, cellular
network, and Bluetooth. These ECUs may introduce attack
surfaces to the CAN bus as well as ECUs [5]–[9]. It is difficult
to upgrade the existing in-vehicle network protocols to encrypt
data or authenticate messages due to the lack of backward
compatibility with legacy systems and the resource constraints
of ECUs such as memory size [10]. Hence, Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs) have been developed to detect attacks on
the CAN bus by tracking abnormal deviations in physical
properties of the CAN bus or ECUs [11], [12]. Commonly
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Fig. 1. Architecture of VIDS. A VIDS is implemented on the microcontroller
of ECU A. In order to measure voltages of the CAN bus lines, the microcon-
troller of ECU A is directly connected to the CAN bus lines via two extra
wires (two red lines). If ECU A is compromised, the adversary may launch
voltage-based attacks using the directly connected wires.
exploited physical properties are message frequency [13],
clock skew of an ECU [11], [14], entropy of the CAN bus
[15], and voltage levels of the CAN bus [10], [16], [17].
It is difficult for an adversary to mimic voltage characteris-
tics of an ECU because they depend on the CAN transceiver’s
hardware such as transistors and diodes. As a result, using
voltage characteristics as a fingerprint of an ECU is more
effective and reliable than other physical properties, such
as clock skew, in detecting attacks on the CAN bus [10],
[16], [17]. A voltage-based IDS (VIDS) is implemented as
software in the microcontroller of an ECU. A CAN transceiver
measures the voltage difference between the CAN bus lines
(i.e., CANH and CANL), which is not sufficient to establish
voltage characteristics. Also, the microcontroller cannot access
measured voltage values since a CAN controller only provides
the decoded bit information to the microcontroller. In order to
measure voltages of the CAN bus lines, the microcontroller
is directly connected to CANH and CANL using extra wires,
respectively, as illustrated in Fig. 1. These two extra wires
introduce new attack surfaces on the CAN bus and ECUs. If an
ECU installed with VIDS is compromised, the adversary may
manipulate voltage levels of CANH and CANL using these
wires in order to disable VIDS or impede CAN transceivers’
operations.
In this paper, we propose four voltage-based attacks using
the extra wires: 1) an overcurrent attack, 2) a denial-of-service
(DoS) attack, 3) a forced retransmission attack, and 4) a
pulse attack. In the overcurrent attack, the adversary makes
the current that flows into the microcontroller with VIDS
exceed the hardware limit of the microcontroller (i.e., the
current absolute maximum rating), which may damage the
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2microcontroller. In the DoS attack, the adversary keeps the
CAN bus in an idle state by holding the voltages of the
CAN bus lines at one level, by which messages cannot be
transmitted. In the forced retransmission attack, the adversary
violates the bit timing requirement of the CAN protocol to
make an error, which makes a message be retransmitted. In
the pulse attack, the adversary arbitrarily changes the voltages
of the CAN bus lines by applying a pulse signal, which blocks
message transmission.
We make the following contributions in this paper:
• We propose four voltage-based attacks that are an over-
current attack, a DoS attack, a forced retransmission
attack, and a pulse attack by manipulating the voltage
levels of the CAN bus lines using the extra wires.
• We propose a fuse-based Intrusion Response System
(IRS) and a heat-based IRS that detect and mitigate the
voltage-based attacks by isolating the compromised ECU
from the CAN bus.
• We demonstrate the proposed voltage-based attacks and
evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed IRSs using a
CAN bus testbed. Our evaluation shows that the voltage-
based attacks can be implemented in practice. We also
demonstrate that the proposed IRSs mitigate the voltage-
based attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The related
work on the IDSs for the CAN protocol is reviewed in Section
II. Section III summarizes a brief background on the CAN
protocol and explains a CAN transceiver’s operation. Section
IV presents the adversary model, and Section V describes the
voltage-based attacks. The hardware-based IRSs are proposed
in Section VI. The experimental results are presented in
Section VII. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Many works have proposed various IDSs that detect cyber
attacks using abnormal deviations in the traffic through the
CAN bus. Based on the fact that most of the messages
in the CAN protocol are transmitted with a fixed length
and frequency, an IDS that detects the existence of spoofed
messages using a frequency of message occurrence is proposed
[13]. Also, the authors of [15] proposed the entropy-based
IDS that exploits coincidence among a set of messages. The
entropy-based IDS, however, can be bypassed if an adversary
replicates structure and pattern of the legitimate traffic [11].
Hence, IDSs that fingerprint each ECU by exploiting ECU’s
physical properties are developed [11], [16], [17]. For instance,
the authors of [11] proposed the clock-based IDS (CIDS) that
uses the clock skew of ECUs to fingerprint each ECU. It is
demonstrated that the CIDS can be bypassed by the cloak-
ing attack that matches the interarrival time of the spoofed
messages to that of the legitimate messages [14], [18].
The voltage characteristics are determined by the CAN
transceiver’s hardware and cannot be modified by the mi-
crocontroller’s software, which makes mimicking the voltage
characteristics through cyber attacks difficult for an adversary
[16]. Although connecting the microcontroller’s analog pins
to the CAN bus lines has a potential risk, many works have
proposed VIDSs [10], [16], [17]. In [10], the proposed VIDS
exploits the mean squared error between the measured voltage
and each ECU’s reference voltage that has been collected
before an attack. The VIDS proposed in [16] measures the
voltages of each CAN bus line and extracts features from
the distribution of the measured voltage samples. The voltage
difference between the CAN bus lines and transition time
between bits 0 and 1 are exploited to detect abnormal devia-
tions in the voltage characteristics by using machine learning
algorithms in [17].
VIDSs measure the voltages of CANH and CANL to extract
the voltage characteristics of each ECU. An oscilloscope is
used to measure the voltage in [10] and [17], which may not
be possible in a car due to limitations in power and space. Al-
ternatively, a VIDS may be implemented in a microcontroller,
which requires 12V that can be supplied from a car battery
[16]. If the microcontroller or oscilloscope is compromised,
the adversary may exploit the wires connected to the CAN
bus lines to launch attacks. The recent works on the VIDSs,
however, did not discuss any potential cyber attacks in which
these wires are maliciously used, nor did the works propose a
protection mechanism to mitigate the attacks [10], [16], [17].
We consider such attacks in this paper.
Despite the effectiveness of an IDS in protecting the CAN
bus, the IDS is limited to detecting cyber attacks and alerting
an operator of the automobile. The reaction to the detected
attacks remains to the operator of the automobile [19]. An
IRS, however, can detect an attack and promptly mitigate the
attack [13], [19].
The contributions of this paper differ from our previous
work [1] in that we investigate more attack surfaces of VIDS
and improve a state-of-the-art IRS against the voltage-based
attacks. We develop a pulse attack that may block message
transmission using pulse signals. We also develop a heat-based
IRS that can be reusable without replacing a fuse or resetting
a circuit breaker after mitigating a voltage-based attack.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, the CAN protocol is reviewed, and the
operation of a CAN transceiver is discussed. We explain
analog pin modes of a microcontroller, which are used for
measuring the voltage and generating electrical signals.
A. CAN Protocol Background
The CAN protocol is a multi-master broadcast bus network
in which any ECU can transmit messages and receive all ongo-
ing messages through the CAN bus. An ECU that accesses the
CAN bus first can transmit a message. If two or more ECUs
attempt to send messages simultaneously, the message with
the smallest ID is first transmitted through a content-based
collision detection process called arbitration. For example,
consider two ECUs A and B that try to send their messages
with IDs 0x010 and 0x001, respectively. ECU A recognizes
that a higher priority message is being transmitted and stops
transmitting its message through an arbitration. Bits 0 and 1
are also called dominant and recessive bits, respectively.
3Fig. 2. Structure of a data frame in the CAN protocol.
Fig. 3. Voltage levels of CANH and CANL when dominant and recessive
bits are transmitted by a CAN transceiver whose supply voltage is 5.0V.
A data frame in the CAN protocol consists of 7 fields as
illustrated in Fig. 2, and the length of the data field can be
varied from 1 to 8 bytes. As shown in the structure of the data
frame, the data field is not encrypted, and there does not exist a
field for message authentication. If a message is not transmit-
ted and received correctly because of external electromagnetic
interference or malfunction of CAN transceivers, the ECU
retransmits that message after an error frame is transmitted.
B. Operation of CAN Transceivers
The CAN bus consists of two bus lines terminated by two
120Ω resistors. In order to make the CAN bus more robust to
the external electromagnetic interference, the CAN protocol
uses the differential voltage between CANH and CANL to
represent a bit. When transmitting a recessive bit, both CANH
and CANL are set to the same value, which makes the
differential voltage be 0.0V. When transmitting a dominant
bit, CANH and CANL are set to different voltages to make
the differential voltage larger than a predetermined threshold,
typically 0.9V. Fig. 3 illustrates the voltage levels of CANH
and CANL when transmitting dominant and recessive bits
using a CAN transceiver whose supply voltage is 5.0V. For a
recessive bit, both CANH and CANL are set to nominal 2.5V
to make the differential voltage be 0.0V. When transmitting a
dominant bit, the differential voltage is 2.0V since CANH and
CANL are set to nominal 3.5V and 1.5V, respectively.1
The two transistors in a CAN transceiver control the voltage
levels of CANH and CANL to transmit bits as illustrated in
Fig. 4. When transmitting a recessive bit, the transistors are
in the off-state in which current cannot flow from the supply
voltage VDD to the ground. Due to the reference voltage (i.e.,
nominal 2.5V) applied to both CANH and CANL, the voltage
1For a recessive bit, the voltage levels of CANH and CANL are 2.3V
when we use a CAN transceiver whose supply voltage is 3.3V, in which the
differential voltage is still 0.0V. For a dominant bit, the CAN transceiver sets
CANH and CANL to 3.0V and 1.0V, respectively. Hence, the differential
voltage becomes 2.0V [20], [21]. Although the supply voltage of the CAN
transceivers might be different, the CAN transceivers exploit the differential
voltage between CANH and CANL to represent a bit [20]–[25].
Fig. 4. Schematic of Microchip MCP2551 CAN transceiver that is composed
of two BJTs and two diodes. The driver control turns off the BJTs when
transmitting a recessive bit and turns them on when transmitting a dominant
bit. The impedance RL between CANH and CANL is 60Ω because two 120Ω
termination resistors are connected in parallel.
levels of the CAN bus lines are set to the reference voltage. As
a result, the differential voltage becomes 0.0V that represents
the recessive bit.
When transmitting a dominant bit, the driver control lets
the transistors be in the on-state in which an electric path
is created between the emitter and the collector in bipolar
junction transistors (BJTs) or the source and the drain in field
effect transistors (FETs). Then, current flows from VDD to the
ground. Due to this current flowing through the termination
resistors, the voltage is dropped from CANH to CANL, and
the differential voltage becomes non-zero. Since the operation
of BJT and FET as a switch is identical, the analysis on
the operation of a Microchip MCP2551 CAN transceiver that
is composed of BJTs can be applied to any types of CAN
transceivers that consist of FETs [23]. A Microchip MCP2551
CAN transceiver sets the voltages of CANH and CANL to
3.5V and 1.5V, respectively. The voltage is dropped by 0.7V
between the base and the emitter of the BJT when the BJT is
in the on-state. Since VDD is 5.0V, the voltage at the collector
of the BJT connected to CANH becomes 4.3V. The voltage
is again dropped by 0.7V after the diode, which makes the
voltage of CANH be 3.5-3.6V. Similarly, the voltage of CANL
becomes 1.4-1.5V because the voltage is increased by 0.7V at
the BJT and the diode, respectively.
C. Analog Pin Modes in Microcontroller
A microprocessor measures voltage via its analog pin set
to the input mode by using an Analog-to-Digital Converter
(ADC) that is embedded in the microprocessor [26]–[30].
Also, a microprocessor may generate electric signals such as
a Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) signal using an analog
pin if that analog pin is set to the output mode [26]–[28].
For example, Microchip ATmega328P used in an Arduino
UNO Rev3 board, NXP MPC563 used in an ECU of Hyundai
Sonata, and Renesas V850 used in an Engine Control Module
of Toyota Camry provide analog pins that can be used to
measure voltage or generate PWM signals [27], [29], [30].
IV. ADVERSARY MODEL
In this section, we describe an adversary model for voltage-
based attacks on the CAN bus and VIDS. Consider first how
an ECU with VIDS can be compromised. If an adversary
accesses the CAN bus physically via an On-Board Diagnostics
(OBD)-II port that is mandated for all cars in the US [31] and
EU [32], the adversary may upload its malicious code to the
4TABLE I
COMBINATIONS OF ANALOG PIN MODES OF PH AND PL FOR MEASURING
THE VOLTAGE AND LAUNCHING ATTACKS.
PH mode PL mode Type of attack
Input Input Not an attack, setting for measuring voltage
Input High DoS attack
Input Low Passive overcurrent attack
High Input Forced retransmission attack
High Low Active overcurrent attack
Low Input DoS attack or passive overcurrent attack
Low High DoS attack or active overcurrent attack
Low Low DoS attack or passive overcurrent attack
Pulse Input Pulse attack
Input Pulse Pulse attack
ECU with VIDS using a pass-thru device such as Hyundai
Global Diagnostic System [33], Ford Vehicle Communication
Module [34], Volkswagen VAG-COM Diagnostic System [35],
or Toyota Technical Information System [36]. The adversary
may also remotely compromise an ECU without physical
access to the CAN bus if that ECU is equipped with a
telematics unit [5], [9], [37]. Then, any ECU on the CAN
bus including the ECU with VIDS can be compromised using
the compromised ECU [9].
Although an adversary may compromise an ECU with
VIDS, the firmware of the CAN controller cannot be modified
without a special equipment [38]. Hence, the adversary cannot
manipulate the output voltage of the CAN transceiver in order
to violate the CAN protocol. The adversary, however, can
manipulate the analog pin modes of the microcontroller once
the ECU with VIDS is compromised. As a result, the adversary
may apply electric signals to the CAN bus by controlling the
analog pin modes as explained in Section III.
V. VOLTAGE-BASED ATTACKS
In this section, we introduce four proposed voltage-based
attacks that are an overcurrent attack, a DoS attack, a forced
retransmission attack, and a pulse attack. Let us denote two
analog pins of the microcontroller with VIDS that are con-
nected to CANH and CANL as PH and PL, respectively. We
discuss combinations of PH and PL for the normal operation
of a VIDS and voltage-based attacks. An analog pin can be
in either 1) input for measuring the voltage, 2) high voltage
output, 3) low voltage output, or 4) pulse output. We consider
two levels of the voltage output, and a PWM signal can be
generated by switching low and high voltage output modes in
the pulse output mode.2
In the normal operation of a VIDS, both PH and PL are in
the input mode to measure the voltage levels of CANH and
CANL, respectively. If the adversary compromises an ECU
with VIDS, the adversary may change the pin modes of PH
and PL by uploading its malicious code. Some combinations
of the analog pin modes may damage the microcontroller
with VIDS, block message transmission, or cause message
retransmission as listed in Table I.
2Depending on microcontrollers, an analog pin may generate multiple levels
of the output voltage. In this paper, we consider the binary levels of the output
voltage [26].
(a) Passive overcurrent attack (b) Active overcurrent attack
Fig. 5. Circuit diagrams under the overcurrent attacks. The red curve indicates
the flow of the current in each overcurrent attack. (a) In the passive overcurrent
attack, the current flows from VDD to PL when a dominant bit is transmitted.
(b) In the active overcurrent attack, the current flows from PH to PL
regardless of the bits.
A. Overcurrent Attack
A microcontroller may absorb current below a threshold
through an analog pin due to its hardware limitation, which
is called the current absolute maximum rating, Imax. If
current larger than this limit flows into the analog pin, the
microcontroller can be damaged by an electric shock. The
idea of the overcurrent attack is that the adversary makes the
current larger than Imax flow into PL. For instance, values of
Imax are 40mA for Microchip ATmega328P [26] and Renesas
V850 [39] and 20mA for NXP MPC563 [30].3
A small current flows through the analog pin of the micro-
controller when measuring voltage. Due to the high impedance
at the microcontroller, current drawn by the microcontroller is
negligible, which is in the order of nA. The current flowing
through an analog pin during the voltage measurement is much
smaller than Imax and does not damage the microcontroller.
The adversary, however, may make the microcontroller
absorb current through PL by manipulating the analog pin
mode. Let VH,b and VL,b be the voltages of CANH and CANL
when bit b is transmitted, respectively, where b is either 0 or
1. For instance, the voltage of CANL when a recessive bit
is transmitted is denoted as VL,1. In order to let the current
larger than Imax flow into the microcontroller, VH,0 − VL,0
must meet the following condition.
(VH,0 − VL,0)
RL
> Imax, (1)
where RL is 60Ω and Imax depends on a hardware limit of
the microcontroller, typically 40mA.
We propose two types of the overcurrent attacks, namely
passive and active overcurrent attacks, by changing the pin
modes of PL and PH as illustrated in Fig. 5. The adversary
only changes PL from the input mode to the low voltage
output mode to launch the passive overcurrent attack. Since
VH,0 is 3.5V as shown in Fig. 6a, the current absorbed
through PL can be computed as 3.5V−0.0V60Ω =58.3mA, which
3The datasheet of Renesas V850 does not provide the current absolute
maximum rating. Since the voltage absolute maximum rating of Renesas V850
and operating condition such as temperature are similar to that of Microchip
ATmega328P, it is reasonable to assume that the current absolute maximum
rating of Renesas V850 is similar to Microchip ATmega328P, which is 40mA.
5(a) Passive overcurrent attack (b) Active overcurrent attack
Fig. 6. Voltages of CANH and CANL under the overcurrent attacks. (a)
In the passive overcurrent attack, the maximum voltage difference between
CANH and CANL is 3.5V when a dominant bit is transmitted. (b) In the
active overcurrent attack, the voltage difference is always 5.0V.
Fig. 7. Voltages of the CAN bus under the DoS attack when Vattack,L is
5.0V. Both CANH and CANL become 5.0V, which represents a recessive bit.
satisfies Eq. (1). In the passive overcurrent attack, the current
is supplied from a car battery that can provide the current in the
order of Ampere as illustrated in Fig. 5a. In order to launch the
active overcurrent attack, the adversary changes PH and PL
to the high voltage output mode and the low voltage output
mode, respectively. VH,0 and VL,0 become 5.0V and 0.0V,
respectively, as shown in Fig. 6b. Then, the current flowing
through PL is computed as 5.0V−0.0V60Ω =83.3mA that is also
larger than Imax. In the active overcurrent attack, the current
is supplied from the microcontroller as illustrated in Fig. 5b.
B. Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack
In order to transmit a bit on the CAN bus, the differential
voltage between CANH and CANL, VDiff , must satisfy the
CAN protocol. The idea of the DoS attack is that the adversary
increases the voltage level of CANL such that VDiff is always
smaller than the decision threshold for determining a dominant
bit. As a result, a recessive bit can only be transmitted, which
means that the CAN bus is in the idle state. Also, messages
cannot be transmitted. The adversary sets PL from the input
mode to the high voltage output mode. Let Vattack,L denote
the voltage applied to CANL by the adversary using PL. Then,
VDiff can be computed as follows
VDiff = VH,b − Vattack,L. (2)
When a recessive bit is transmitted, both CANH and CANL
are set to Vattack,L under the DoS attack because current
does not flow through the termination resistors. Using Eq. (2),
VDiff becomes 0.0V, which represents a recessive bit. Al-
though the voltages of CANH and CANL are manipulated
as illustrated in Fig. 7, the recessive bit can be transmitted
under the attack. A CAN transceiver determines a dominant
bit if 0.9V<VDiff<5.0V with the differential input hysteresis
Fig. 8. Bit decision criteria of Microchip MCP2551 CAN transceiver. A CAN
transceiver can determine a dominant bit if VDiff is larger than 0.9V and a
recessive bit if VDiff is less than 0.5V.
Fig. 9. Voltage of CANL under the forced retransmission attack. Compared
with the voltage level in the normal operation, the voltage of CANL is pulled
up to Vattack,H , which increases the transition time.
between 100-200mV as shown in Fig. 8. When transmitting
a dominant bit, the adversary may thwart the transmission
of the dominant bit by setting Vattack,L to make VDiff
smaller than 0.9V. If Vattack,L is larger than 3.5V, VH,0 also
becomes Vattack,L because current cannot flow through the
termination resistors due to the diode in the CAN transceivers.
Hence, VDiff again becomes 0.0V, which indicates that the
DoS attack is successfully launched. Also, the adversary may
launch the DoS attack by setting PH in the low voltage output
mode since VDiff is always equal to or less than 0.0V.
C. Forced Retransmission Attack
The duration of one bit must satisfy the timing requirement
of the CAN protocol according to the CAN bus speed. The
idea of the forced retransmission attack is that the adversary
makes the transition time from a dominant bit to a recessive
bit longer than the nominal value, typically 70-130ns [22]. As
a result, an error occurs while receiving a message, especially
at the ACK delimiter position of a data frame as shown in
Fig 2. The adversary increases the transition time, thus making
a dominant bit at the ACK delimiter position that has to be
a recessive bit. The adversary changes PH from the input
mode to the high voltage output mode to launch the forced
retransmission attack.
In order to analyze the transition time from a dominant bit
to a recessive bit quantitatively, we define the bit length time
τbit as follows
τbit , t90% − tstart of bit 0, (3)
where tstart of bit 0 and t90% denote the time at which a
dominant bit starts and the time at which the voltage of CANL
reaches 90% of Vattack,H , respectively, as illustrated in Fig.
6Fig. 10. Voltages of the CAN bus under the forced retransmission attack
when Vattack,H is 5.0V. When a recessive bit is transmitted right after a
dominant bit, the transition time of CANL’s voltage level increases. Hence,
an ECU may receive a dominant bit because VDiff is greater than 0.9V
when sampling the voltages of the CAN bus lines at the instances indicated
with the black arrows facing downward.
9. τbit also indicates the sum of the duration of the dominant
bit and the transition time. For instance, if the CAN bus speed
is set to 500kbps, τbit without the attack is nominal 2µs.
Let Vattack,H denote the voltage applied to CANH by the
adversary via PH , and we consider Vattack,H>2.5V. Fig. 10
illustrates the voltages of CANH and CANL under the forced
retransmission attack when Vattack,H is 5.0V. When transmit-
ting a recessive bit, both CANH and CANL become Vattack,H
since current does not flow through the termination resistors. A
recessive bit can be transmitted under the attack. A dominant
bit can also be transmitted because VDiff is greater than 0.9V
where VDiff increases as increasing Vattack,H . If Vattack,H
becomes greater than 3.5V, the adversary forcefully sets CANL
higher than the normal operating range of the CAN transceiver.
As a result, the voltage of CANL switches from 1.5V to
Vattack,H when a recessive bit is transmitted right after a
dominant bit, which increases the transition time as illustrated
in Fig. 9. Using its local clock, an ECU decodes a bit by
sampling the voltage levels of CANH and CANL with the
fixed period that is determined by the CAN bus speed. If the
duration of a bit is longer than the nominal value, the ECU
cannot decode the bit correctly. Hence, an error occurs while
receiving a message, and that message is retransmitted.
D. Pulse Attack
The idea of the pulse attack is blocking message transmis-
sion using a PWM signal. Consider that the PWM signal is
applied to CANL using PL. Then, there are four possible cases
for the voltage behavior of the CAN bus because the PWM
signal could be in either the high voltage output mode or the
low voltage output mode when a dominant or recessive bit
is transmitted, respectively. If the PWM signal is in the high
voltage output mode while a dominant bit is transmitted, both
CANH and CANL become the same voltage, which represents
a recessive bit. Hence, the dominant bit cannot be transmitted
through the CAN bus, and message transmission is blocked.
A bit can be transmitted correctly in the other three cases
because VDiff satisfies the CAN protocol.
A PWM signal and the start of the message are not
perfectly synchronized in most of the time because the PWM
signal is applied in arbitrary time without considering message
transmission. As a result, the case in which a dominant bit is
tried to be transmitted when the PWM signal is in the high
voltage output always occurs. If the PWM signal is applied
to CANH, a dominant bit cannot be transmitted if the PWM
signal is in the low voltage output. The pulse attack occurs
when a PWM signal is applied to either PH or PL where the
other analog pin is in the input mode.
A CAN controller determines a received bit using the
voltage signal from the CAN transceiver. In order to determine
the bit, this voltage signal has to stay constant longer than a
predetermined threshold, typically 300-350ns [40]. Otherwise,
the CAN controller cannot decode the received bit. The impact
of the PWM signal during message transmission can be
negligible if the duration of blocking the transmission of a
dominant bit is shorter than this predetermined threshold. For
example, when the duty cycle is fixed at 50%, the period of
the PWM signal has to be longer than 700ns to thwart the
transmission of a dominant bit, which launches the pulse attack
successfully. If the period of the PWM signal is twice longer
than the message transmission time for the fixed duty cycle
50%, the PWM signal changes the voltage levels of the CAN
bus lines for the entire message transmission time, which is
identical to the DoS attack and forced retransmission attack.
Hence, we only consider the period less than the message
transmission time in this paper.
VI. HARDWARE-BASED INTRUSION RESPONSE SYSTEMS
In this section, we propose two hardware-based IRSs,
namely fuse-based IRS and heat-based IRS, and explain how
these IRSs may mitigate the voltage-based attacks. As shown
in Fig. 11a, the fuse-based IRS consists of fuses or circuit
breakers that are attached between the microcontroller’s analog
pins and the CAN bus lines, while the heat-based IRS consists
of heating coil and thermostats as illustrated in Fig. 11b. The
current flowing through the analog pins can be used as an
indicator of the voltage-based attacks because the current flows
through these analog pins under the voltage-based attacks.
The hardware-based IRSs physically isolate a VIDS from the
CAN bus as soon as any one of the voltage-based attacks
is detected. The hardware components such as fuses, circuit
breakers, heating coil, or thermostats operate independently of
the microcontroller. Hence, the cyber attack on an automobile
cannot disable the proposed IRSs. In the rest of this section,
we explain how each proposed IRS can mitigate the voltage-
based attacks.
A. IRSs for Overcurrent Attack
The overcurrent attack can be mitigated by limiting the
current that flows into the microcontroller to be less than the
current absolute maximum rating, Imax. A fuse may limit
the current since it disconnects two parts of a circuit when
current larger than its current rating flows longer than its
opening time. The typical opening time of very fast-acting
fuses is in the order of µs to ms [41], [42]. Since it takes a
longer time to damage a microcontroller by the overcurrent
than to open a fuse [26], the fuse disconnects the wire before
the microcontroller is burned. The microcontrollers may be
damaged by the overcurrent within a short amount of time
in the order of ns and µs. Micro-electro-mechanical system
(MEMS)-based fuses or thin film-based fuses can be used for
the fuse-based IRS because their opening times are in the order
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Fig. 11. Structures of the proposed hardware-based IRSs.
of µs for the MEMS-based fuse [43] and in the order of ns
for the thin-film based fuse [44]. A fuse does not thwart the
voltage measurement at the microcontroller when the fuse is
attached to an analog pin as illustrated in Fig. 11a since the
fuse is a wire that does not induce any voltage drop ideally. A
fuse with the current rating smaller than Imax can be used
for the fuse-based IRS because 58.3mA and 83.3mA flow
through PL under the passive and active overcurrent attacks,
respectively, as computed in Section V. A fuse has to be
replaced every time after it blows out. Though replacing a fuse
is simple, a circuit breaker is reusable after it isolates a VIDS
during the overcurrent attack. A system operator, however, still
has to reset the circuit breaker manually.
A thermostat also disconnects two parts of a circuit if it is
heated above its temperature limiting threshold and connects
them again if it is cooled down below the temperature limiting
threshold. A heating coil is made of a metal composite such
as nichrome that generates heat when current flows through it.
Under the passive overcurrent attack, heat is generated from
the heating coil connected to CANL due to the current flowing
through PL. Both heating coils generate heat under the active
overcurrent attack because the current flows from PH to PL.
The thermostat is heated and isolates a VIDS from the CAN
bus. Consider that the malicious code is removed from the
microcontroller. The current does not flow through the heating
coil, thus cooling down the thermostat below the temperature
limiting threshold. Then, the wires from the microcontroller
to the CAN bus lines are connected again without replacing
any hardware components. The heating coil and thermostat
are a wire if the thermostat is closed. Hence, the heating coil
and thermostat do not thwart the voltage measurement at the
microcontroller when they are attached to an analog pin as
illustrated in Fig. 11b.
One might argue that a resettable fuse can be used instead of
a thermostat because a system operator also does not need to
replace the resettable fuse. Different from fuses or thermostats
that completely disconnect a wire, the resettable fuse, however,
allows a leakage current in the order of a hundred mA,
which is large enough to damage the microcontroller when
the resettable fuse is open [45]. Hence, the resettable fuse
should not be used in the proposed hardware-based IRSs.
Fig. 12. Test circuit for measuring current in the DoS attack.
B. IRSs for DoS Attack, Forced Retransmission Attack, and
Pulse Attack
The output voltage from an analog pin has to be limited in
order to mitigate the DoS attack, forced retransmission attack,
and pulse attack since an abnormal voltage is applied to either
CANH or CANL under these attacks. Due to this voltage,
current flows through the analog pins under these attacks.
Under the DoS attack, current flows from PL to the ground of
the CAN transceiver when a dominant bit is transmitted. Also,
current flows from PH to the ground of the CAN transceiver
under the forced retransmission attack. Under the pulse attack,
current flows through either PL or PH if the PWM signal
is applied to CANL or CANH, respectively. Hence, fuses or
circuit breakers can be used to mitigate these attacks.
In order to determine the current rating of the fuse, the
current flowing through PL and PH under the DoS attack,
forced retransmission attack, and pulse attack is analyzed,
respectively. Fig. 12 illustrates a test circuit that emulates the
voltage levels of the transistor inside the CAN transceiver
under the DoS attack using a Motorola Solutions 2N2905A
PNP BJT. When the BJT is in the on-state, we measure that
281mA flows into the ground using the test circuit. For the
forced retransmission attack, we compute the current that flows
through PH as
(5.0V−1.5V)
60Ω =58.3mA. Since the voltage levels
under the pulse attack via CANL is the same as that under the
DoS attack, the current flowing through PL becomes 281mA.
For the pulse attack via CANH, the current flowing through
PH becomes 58.3mA as the forced retransmission attack.
Hence, fuses or circuit breakers with current rating less than
58.3mA mitigate these attacks.
We analyze that current flows through the analog pins under
the DoS attack, forced retransmission attack, and pulse attack.
By exploiting this fact, the heating coil may heat the thermostat
during these attacks, and the thermostat disconnects the extra
wires. As a result, the heat-based IRS can also mitigate these
attacks by isolating a VIDS from the CAN bus.
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we analyze the overcurrent attack, DoS
attack, forced retransmission attack, and pulse attack on a
CAN bus testbed. We demonstrate that the proposed hardware-
based IRSs may mitigate the voltage-based attacks.
A. Testbed and Equipment
We implement a CAN bus testbed that consists of three
ECUs as shown in Fig. 13. Each testbed ECU is composed
of an Arduino UNO Rev3 board and a Sparkfun CAN bus
shield. The CAN bus shield uses a Microchip MCP2515 CAN
controller and a Microchip MCP2551 CAN transceiver. We set
the CAN bus speed to 500kbps, which is widely used in many
8Fig. 13. CAN bus testbed. The microcontroller of ECU A is connected to
CANH and CANL using two extra wires. ECU A launches the proposed
voltage-based attacks. ECU C transmits messages every 1s, and ECU B logs
the received messages.
modern cars [11]. Since a VIDS is assumed to be installed on
the microcontroller of ECU A, two analog pins A0 and A5
of the Arduino board in ECU A are connected to CANH and
CANL, respectively. ECU A is compromised and launches
the proposed voltage-based attacks by changing the modes of
these analog pins. ECU C transmits messages every 1s, and
ECU B logs all the received messages.
We use a Tektronix TDS2004B oscilloscope to measure
voltages of the CAN bus lines and bit duration in the normal
message transmission and under the voltage-based attacks. A
Keysight 34461A digital multimeter is used to measure voltage
and current. The minimum period of a PWM signal that an
Arduino board can generate is 1.02ms, and the Arduino board
cannot generate various voltage levels from an analog pin [26].
We use a Tektronix AFG3021 function generator to apply
PWM signals with various periods in order to determine the
minimum period for a successful pulse attack. A Keysight
U8031A power supply is used to apply various constant volt-
ages to CANH and CANL to determine the minimum voltage
levels for successful DoS attack and forced retransmission
attack, respectively.
We use Littelfuse 0326 fuses with current rating 10mA
to implement the fuse-based IRS. For the heat-based IRS,
we use Sparkfun heating pad and Sensata Airpax 67L040
thermostats with temperature limiting threshold 40oC. In the
test circuit as illustrated in Fig. 14, VDD is 5.0V, and the
analog pins are in the input mode. The microcontroller can
correctly measure the voltages of CANH and CANL (i.e.,
5.0V and 0.0V at A0 and A5, respectively), which indicates
that the fuse does not thwart the voltage measurement at
the microcontroller. By repeating the same experiments after
replacing the fuses with circuit breakers and thermostats with
heating coils, respectively, we verify that our proposed IRSs
do not thwart the voltage measurement.
Fig. 15 shows the voltage levels of CANH and CANL
in the normal message transmission when the message ID
is 0x01 and data is 0x01. Due to hardware characteristics
of the CAN transceiver, the actual voltages of CANH and
CANL are 2.4V when a recessive bit is transmitted. When
transmitting a dominant bit, the actual voltages of CANH and
CANL become 3.4V and 1.5V, respectively. The voltage levels
Fig. 14. Test circuit for checking that the Arduino board can measure the
voltage with the fuses.
Fig. 15. Voltages of CANH (in yellow) and CANL (in blue) in the normal
message transmission.
Fig. 16. Test circuit to emulate the voltage levels of the CAN bus lines under
the overcurrent attacks. VDD is set to 3.5V in the passive overcurrent attack
and 5.0V in the active overcurrent attack, respectively.
for both dominant and recessive bits, however, meet the CAN
protocol [22]. Since the CAN bus speed is set to 500kbps, one
bit is 2µs long.
B. Voltage-based Attacks
In this section, we present the experimental results of the
voltage-based attacks using our CAN bus testbed.
1) Overcurrent Attack: Since we do not want to damage
our testbed ECUs, we implement a test circuit as illustrated in
Fig. 16 to emulate the CAN bus under the overcurrent attack.
In the test circuit, let the ground and VDD represent PL of
the microcontroller and the voltage of CANH, respectively.
To emulate the passive overcurrent attack, VDD is set to
3.5V using the power supply, and the current flowing into the
ground is measured to be 58mA. When emulating the active
overcurrent attack, VDD is set to 5.0V, and 83mA flows into
the ground. These experimental values closely match with the
theoretical values computed in Section V. Since the current
is supplied from the microcontroller in the active overcurrent
attack, the Arduino board may not generate 83mA due to its
hardware limitation. We measure that the maximum 52mA can
be provided from an analog pin of the Arduino board, which is
still large enough to damage many microprocessors including
Microchip ATmega328P, Renesas V850, and NXP MPC563
[26], [30], [39].
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Fig. 17. Current under the overcurrent attacks using the test circuit. Before
launching the attacks, the current does not flow. After launching the attacks,
the current greater than Imax (i.e., 40mA) flows into the ground in both
attacks, which may damage the microcontroller.
Fig. 18. Voltages of CANH and CANL when the DoS attack is successfully
launched by ECU A when Vattack,L is set to 5.0V.
Fig. 17 demonstrates the current flowing into the ground in
the test circuit under the overcurrent attacks. Both passive and
active overcurrent attacks occur at 20s, which is indicated by
the black dashed line. The red dashed line represents Imax
(i.e., 40mA) of the Arduino board. The current does not flow
through the analog pins before the overcurrent attacks occur.
After the attacks, however, the current larger than Imax flows
through PL, which may damage the microcontroller.
2) DoS Attack: Fig. 18 shows that the voltages of CANH
and CANL become 5.0V when Vattack,L is set to 5.0V. Since
VDiff is always 0.0V, a dominant bit cannot be transmit-
ted, which demonstrates that the DoS attack is successfully
launched using ECU A. In order to determine the minimum
voltage that successfully launches the DoS attack, we connect
the power supply to CANL. Vattack,L is increased from 0.1V
to 5.0V to cover the output voltage range of many micro-
processors [29], [30]. The attack indicator is 0 if the attack
fails and 1 if the attack is successful. As shown in Fig. 19,
the DoS attack is successful if Vattack,L is between 2.2V and
5.0V since VDiff is always less than the decision threshold
for determining a dominant bit (i.e., 0.9V for Microchip
MCP2551).
3) Forced Retransmission Attack: Fig. 20 shows the volt-
ages of the CAN bus lines under the forced retransmission
attack by applying 5.0V to CANH. Two consecutive messages
are spaced by about 30µs, which indicates that the message
is retransmitted because the period of the message is 1s. The
voltage of CANH could not be maintained at 5.0V since the
Arduino board cannot generate current large enough to make
VDiff greater than 3.5V. In order to determine the minimum
voltage for the successful forced retransmission attack, we
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Fig. 19. Minimum value of Vattack,L that successfully launches the DoS
attack. The attack indicator is either 0 if the attack fails or 1 the attack
succeeds. The DoS attack becomes successful from Vattack,L=2.2V.
Fig. 20. Voltages of CANH and CANL when Vattack,H=5.0V. The forced
retransmission attack is successfully launched by ECU A. The same voltage
waveform is repeated every 132µs, indicating the message retransmission.
(a) Normal (b) Vattack,H=5.0V
Fig. 21. τbit in the normal message transmission and under the forced
retransmission attack with Vattack,H=5.0V. (a) τbit is 2µs in the normal
message transmission. (b) τbit becomes 3.16µs under the attack.
TABLE II
AVERAGE BIT LENGTH TIME FOR VARIOUS VALUES OF Vattack,H WHEN
THE CAN BUS SPEED IS 500KBPS.
Vattack,H 2.5V 3.0V 3.5V 4.0V 4.5V 5.0V
Average
τbit
2.00µs 2.24µs 2.86µs 2.98µs 3.07µs 3.16µs
increase Vattack,H from 2.5V to 5.0V using the power supply.
The forced retransmission attack becomes successful from
Vattack,H=4.5V. Fig. 21 shows the bit length time τbit in the
normal message transmission and under the forced retransmis-
sion attack if Vattack,H=5.0V. While τbit is 2µs in the normal
message transmission, τbit becomes 3.16µs under the forced
retransmission attack. As a result, the duration of a recessive
bit violates the CAN protocol, which causes an error. Since
there are 7 transitions from a dominant bit to a recessive bit in
a message with the ID 0x01 and data 0x01, Table II shows the
average of τbit when Vattack,H is varied from 2.5V to 5.0V.
4) Pulse Attack: In order to determine the minimum period
of the PWM signal that launches the pulse attack successfully,
we apply the PWM signal with the duty cycle 50%, amplitude
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Fig. 22. Minimum period of the PWM signal that leads to a successful pulse
attack. (a) The pulse attack is successful when the period is larger than 680ns
if the pulse is applied to CANL. (b) The pulse attack becomes successful
when the period is larger than 570ns if the pulse is applied to CANH.
5.0V, and offset 2.5V (i.e., the low output voltage is 0.0V,
and the high output voltage is 5.0V) to CANL using the
function generator while PH is in the input mode. We increase
the period of the PWM signal from 500ns to 700ns. Then,
we repeat the same experiment after connecting the function
generator to CANH where PL is set to the input mode. Fig. 22
demonstrates that the pulse attack becomes successful if the
period is longer than 680ns and 570ns when the PWM signal
is applied to CANL and CANH, respectively. The pulse attack
via CANH becomes successful with a shorter period than
that via CANL because the transition time increases when the
voltage is applied to CANH.
C. Hardware-based IRSs
In this section, we demonstrate that the fuse-based IRS can
mitigate all four voltage-based attacks. Also, the proof-of-
concept of the heat-based IRS is verified using a test circuit.
1) Fuse-based IRS: We implement the fuse-based IRS as
illustrated in Fig. 11a. 58mA and 83mA flow through PL
under the passive and active overcurrent attacks, respectively.
By using the fuse with current rating 10mA, both overcurrent
attacks can be mitigated since PL is disconnected from CANL.
In order to verify that the fuse-based IRS can mitigate the
DoS attack, forced retransmission attack, and pulse attack, we
design an attack scenario in which ECU A launches an attack
from 10s to 30s, while ECU C transmits messages every 1s.
We repeat this experiment for each of the three attacks. For the
DoS attack and forced retransmission attack, 5.0V is applied
to CANL and CANH, respectively. The period of the PWM
signal is set to 100µs with the duty cycle 50%, amplitude 5.0V,
and offset 2.5V for the pulse attack. The message indicator is
1 if the message is received at ECU B and 0 if the message
transmission fails. For all three voltage-based attacks, ECU B
receives the messages every 1s as normal under each attack
as shown in Fig. 23. Hence, the fuse-based IRS may mitigate
the voltage-based attacks.
2) Heat-based IRS: The maximum current that the Arduino
board can supply is 52mA, by which the heat may not
be generated high enough to let the thermostat disconnect
the wires [26]. We implement a test circuit that emulates
operations of the heat-based IRS where the current to the
heating coil is provided by the power supply instead of the
Arduino board as shown in Fig. 24. Current does not flow
through the heating coil when emulating the normal operation
Fig. 23. Message exchange through the CAN bus under the DoS attack,
forced retransmission attack, and pulse attack. Each attack is launched from
10s to 30s. The fuse-based IRS mitigates all three voltage-based attacks.
Fig. 24. Test circuit to emulate the heat-based IRS. The power supply provides
the current of 1A to the heating coil.
of a VIDS. Since current flows through either PL or PH under
all four voltage-based attacks, we launch an attack by letting
the current of 1A flow the heating coil from the power supply
under the controlled laboratory setting for the safety. In the test
circuit, A0 and A5 are in the input mode while VDD is set to
5.0V. Before emulating an attack, the microcontroller measures
5.0V via A0, which means the analog pin is connected
to VDD. After launching an emulated attack, however, the
microcontroller cannot measure VDD at A0, which indicates
that the thermostat disconnects the wire. These experimental
results demonstrate that the heat-based IRS may mitigate the
voltage-based attacks.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated new vulnerabilities of VIDS
when an adversary maliciously exploits the extra wires given
to VIDS. We proposed four voltage-based attacks that may
damage the microcontroller with VIDS, block message trans-
mission, or make a message be retransmitted by manipulating
the voltage levels of the CAN bus lines. In order to mitigate the
voltage-based attacks, we developed two hardware-based IRSs
that isolate VIDS from the CAN bus once the voltage-based at-
tacks are detected. We demonstrated the voltage-based attacks
and hardware-based IRSs using our CAN bus testbed. Our
work implies that a new attack surface might be introduced to
the CAN bus by the wires that directly connect the CAN bus
lines and VIDS if VIDS is compromised. Hence, in order to
provide security assurance to an automobile, defense systems
based on hardware must be implemented together with VIDS
if the voltage characteristics are exploited as a fingerprint of
ECUs. Although the idea of isolating a compromised VIDS
using thermostats is demonstrated, implementation of the heat-
based IRS in a more practical environment will be studied as
future work.
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